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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

9656

DARRELL DEVERE POULSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The defendant and appellant will be referred to as
defendant. The plaintiff and respondent will be referred
to as the State. References to the record will be designated "R.", and references to the separate transcript
will be designated "T."
A complaint was filed on September 20, 1961,
charging the defendant with the crime of murder in the
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first degree. The preliminary hearing was held October
3, 1961, and defendant was bound over to the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State
of Utah (R. 3, 4). On October 27, 1961, a Notice of
Proposed Defense of Insanity was filed, and a plea of
not guilty was entered ( R. 13) . The case was tried
before the Honorable R. L. Tuckett commencing on
the lith day of December, 1961. A verdict finding the
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree was
returned on December 14, 1961 (R. 107). No recommendation of leniency was made by the jury. Thereafter, an appeal was taken to this Court from the judgment of the District Court in denying the defendant's
Motion for a New Trial (R. 117).
Counsel for the defendant at the trial were Phillip
V. Christenson, Esquire, and M. Dayle Jeffs, Esquire,
both of whom were appointed by the Court. Counsel
on appeal did not participate in the trial of the proceedings or the subsequent motion for new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The testimonial evidence offered by the State consists principally and materially of the following: Mr.
Darlo Sawyer, a resident of American Fork, Utah,
testified that he sought the services of Karen Mechling
to watch his children on the evening of September 16,
1961 (T. 191); that he saw her for the last time at 7:30
p.m. that evening (T. 192); that he returned to his
2
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residence at 2:30 a.m., on the morning of the 17th, and
found a caulking gun in a chair and noticed "four or
five" drops of blood on the floor (T. 193); and, that
the following morning Karen Mechling's body was
found in a vacant lot adjacent to the Sawyer residence
(T. 196-7).
Medical evidence offered by Guy A. Richards,
M.D., tended to establish that the victim had been dead
for several hours at the time of his examination shortly
after 7:00 a.m., on the morning of September 17, 1962,
but could not fix the time of death ( T. 226-229) .
An autopsy was performed by Wilford H. LeCheminant, M.D., who testified, in substance, that
lesions were present on the victim's head, face, hands,
fingers, shoulders and legs ( T. 232-3) ; that the vaginal
area was torn (T. 233); that there was a skull fracture
( T. 234) ; that "there were several lesions that could
in themselves account for the death * * * ;" that the
skull fracture "could account for her death" ( T. 235) ";
that "less than five minutes" elapsed between the blow
to the cranium and the time of death; that semen was
present in the vagina ( T. 237-8) .

A statement of the defendant was received in evidence ( T. 253) as Exhibit 15. In substance; the defendant admitted entering the home, striking the girl
and subsequently having relations with her.
_.. The defendant's case consisted of evidence tending
to establish the defense of insanity, as presented by his
plea. Deputy Utah County Sheriff, Art Harold Child,
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testified that on the Saturday evening, prior to the
offense, that he had questioned the defendant in connection with an earlier attack upon another girl with
a piece of iron ( T. 288-301). The defendant admitted
striking at the girl while she was riding a bicycle, but
that he was frightened away by a ~an who witnessed
the attack. The witness then related the following statement by the defendant: "He told me that when he
would get this feeling [a desire for sexual relations]
he would usually go window peeking and build this up
to a certain pitch, and after he had built himself up to
a certain pitch, he sometimes would have to attack the
girl or have relations with the girl and he didn't think
there was any better way other than this way" (T. 2945). The offense charged in the instant case was committed the same evening that the defendant was questioned and then released by Deputy Sheriff Child.
Mr. Lynn Hanks, Principal of the Springville
Junior High School, testified on behalf of the defendant, as follows: That he was the custodian of the elementary school records of the defendant; that Defendant's
Exhibit 21 was the permanent student record of defendant for the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, grades, reflecting
his attendance and marks (T. 314-5).
Mr. A. LeRoy Erickson, Principal of the Grant
Elementary School which was attended by the defendant, identified Defendant's Exhibit 23, a 6th grade
report of defendant's intellectual, physical, emotional,
aesthetic, social and reverent behavior (T. 319-327).
4
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The former Chief Probation Officer of the Third
District Juvenile Court, Mr. Roy Passey, identified
Defendant's Exhibit 24 as a card from the files of the
probation office pertaining to the defendant and describing_, inter alia, "mauling over women on street" on
December 8, 1954, and "sexual attack on half sister"
on April27, 1955, the latter resulting in his commitment
to the American Fork Training School by the District
Court. The Court refused to admit into evidence Defendant's Exhibit 27 for identification, which purported
to be an Order of Commitment to the Utah State Training School, and related pleadings.
Vernon F. Huston, M.D., Superintendent and
Medical Director of the Utah State Training School
at American Fork, identified Defendant's Exhibit 28,
a history of the defendant's confinement at the institution ( T. 338-9) . The exhibit is a summary of incidents
at the institution relating to the defendant, including
the date of commitment, June 22, 1955, and the date
of discharge, August 8, 1958. Dr. Huston advised that
a vasectomy operation was performed on the defendant
on August 7, 1957, to sterilize him (T. 340).
Mark K. Allen, professor of psychology at Brigham Young University and clinical consultant for the
Utah State Training School testified that he conducted
two psychological examinations on the defendant in
1955 and 1956 (T. 353-4); and that at the time of
said examinations the defendant "was a mentally deficient person with some personality difficulties along
with it" (T. 354).
5
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· Ij a Korner, Chief of the section of Psychology
and Associate Professor of Psychiatry in the Medical
School of the University of Utah, testified as follows:
That he examined the defendant in November, 1961,
with respect to his "mental capacities" (T. 363); that
using the verbal part of the Wechsler Bellvue Test the
defendant had an I.Q. of 67, "which would put him in
what you would call the feeble-minded range" (T.
364) ; that "I came to the opinion that it (finding with
respect to the defendant] could be explained* * *that
mental illness is very frequently in specific cases of this
kind, namely, from very early childhood on * * * "
(T. 365); that between 30 and 40 percent of all individuals who are at the present time in institutions arid
held to be feeble-minded, actually are not feeble-minded,
but are mentally ill" ( T. 366), that "In my opinion
the feeblemindedness is related to a condition of mental
illness (T. 367); that his mental illness is illustrated
by the fallowing testimony:
"Knowledge is usually used to help us in dealing with problems. Intelligence is used to help
us deal with problems. Of course, it means that
we are capable of using the intelligence. And
from the testing, and I would like to stress the
fact I am functioning as a psychologist, basing
my opinion on tests from the test data I have, the
impression-it is my opinion that the little, the
little the defendant has in terms of intelligence
is useless when he is under the impact of an
emotional strain, under any kind of emotional
impact. In such situation we are capable of kind
of holding our emotions back, or kind of post-
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paning them, or talking to ourselves. In such
instances the Mr. Poulson has nothing available
to help him stem whatever he is in. He resembles
at that time a human being without a head, without a brain. He would not be much different
from an animal in such instances. He has not got
the use of these faculties in such a situation."
(T. 368);
that the defendant, "once launched, launched on an
impulse, whatever it is on, something which stirs him
up, once launched upon that he has no built-in mechanism in his machine, so to speak, which can stop him
from completing the act. * * * in him there is very
little difference between thinking, talking, and doing.
* * * I don't think he knows whether he thinks something, whether he does it, or whether he has talked about
it" (T. 373); and, on redirect examination, that the
defendant's response to the Rorschach Test was "very
deviant statistically speaking" ( T. 399).
In rebuttal the State introduced the testimony of
Mr. Dennis I. Greenwood, a psychologist at the Utah
State Hospital, who characterized the defendant as
a "mild" mental deficient (T. 413). Carl Kivler, M.D.,
a medical physician in charge of the mentally retarded
unit at the Utah State Hospital, testified that he had
examined the defendant on several occasions ( T. 420) ;
that he diagnosed the defendant as "mentally retarded
in a degree as mild" (T. 421); that the defendant "knew
the difference between right and wrong" at the time
of the offense (T. 423); that he "understood the nature
and the consequences of his act" (T. 423); that he
7
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found no evidence of psychosis (T. 424); that the defendant "has an unrestrained sexual drive" and is
"sane" (T. 428). On cross examination Dr. Kivler
agreed that a person could be "mentally ill" without
having "delusions" (T. 430-1).
Louis G. Moench, M.D., a Salt Lake City psychiatrist, having examined the defendant prior to trial,
testified as a rebuttal witness that the defendant was
"mildly mentally retarded" (T (. 435) ; that he is suffering from no psychosis (T. 436); that the defendant,
on the night of the incident had "an understanding of
the difference between right and wrong" ( T. 437) ;
and in response to a hypothetical question posed by the
prosecutor, that the defendant had control of his impulses on the night of the offense ( T. 438) .

ARGUlVIENT
POINT I
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL
COURT TO THE JURY WERE ERRONEOUS
AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT IN
THAT THE JURY WAS CHARGED THAT
IT MUST EITHER FIND THE DEFENDANT
GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE OR ACQUIT THE DEFENDANT.
Among its instructions to the jury, the trial court
charged as follows:
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"No. 15: Although there are two degrees of
murder, the evidence in this case is such that
either the defendant is innocent of the charges
of murder, or he is guilty of murder in the first
degree" ( T. 445).
It is submitted that the foregoing instruction did
not properly reflect the alternatives which the jury
should have been given by virtue of the evidence presented at the trial. This instruction followed a charge
to the jury that "the defendant has raised the issue of
his sanity at the time of the alleged offense" (T. 443}.
Other material instructions bearing upon this issue
were in relation to the elements of "felony murder,"
as follows:
"No. 4 : The essential elements of the crime
of murder in the first degree as charged in the
information are as follows:
( 1) That the defendant, Darrell Devere Poulson, killed Karen Mechling on or about the 17th
day of September, 1961, at Utah County, Utah.

( 2) That the killing of Karen Mechling was
committed in the perpetration of the crime of
rape or burglary by the defendant.
( 3) That the said killing was felonious.

( 4) That the said Karen Mechling died within a year and a day after the cause of death was
administered.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each
and all of the above elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the

9
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evidence has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt one or more of said elements, then
you should find the defendant not guilty.
No. 5: Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought.
No. 6: Murder which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a rape or
burglary is murder in the first degree.
No.7: Rape insofar as its definition applies to
the facts in this case is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female, not the wife
of the perpetrator, when the female is under the
age of thirteen years. Likewise, it is rape when
the act of sexual intercourse is accomplished
with a female, not the wife of the perpetrator,
when she is at the time unconscious of the nature
of the act, and this is known to the accused.
The offense of rape is a felony.
No. 8: The statutes of this States provide that
any person who forceably breaks and enters, or
who without force enters an open door, window,
or other aperature of any house, room, apartment or tenement with intent to commit larceny
or any felony is guilty of burglary. One who
enters a place such as those mentioned above
with the specific intent to commit larcency or
any other felony is guilty of burglary, regardless of whether the intent is thereafter carried
out.
No. 9: The word "felonious" as used in these
instructions means performing an act with an
evil heart or purpose, or acting with a deliberate
intention to commit a crime" (T. 441-3).

10
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A. FAILUR.E TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT THE MENTAL CONDITION OF
THE DEFENDANT AT THE TIME OF THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE MAY AFFECT HIS
ABILITY TO ENTERTAIN A SPECIFIC
INTENT ESSENTIAL TO THE CRIME
CHARGED CONSTITUTES MATERIAL
AND SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE TO
THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT.
Significantly, the jury was presented with two
alternative choices in order to find the defendant guilty
of murder in the first degree. According to the instructions the jury could convict, as charged, provided they
found that the killing was "committed in a perpetration
of or attempt to perpetrate, a rape or burglary ... "
(T. 442; italics supplied). Moreover, the jury was
instructed to find that the "killing was felonious"
(T. 442), the word "felonious" being defined as "performing an act with an evil heart or purpose, or acting
with deliberate intention to commit a crime."
Burglary is likewise given a complete definition,
with particular emphasis upon the "specific intent"
essential to that crime.
That burglary requires a specific intent is well
established (Roberts v. State, 136 Tex. Ap. 138, 124
S.W. 2d 128; Hooks v. State, 145 Tenn. 43, 389 S.W.
529). As stated in Simpson v. State~ 81 Fla. 292, 87
So. 920 ( 1921), " ... The mere breaking and entering
a dwelling house is not a fact from which may be in-
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ferred that the accused intended to commit rape or
murder," the court concluding there must be a specific
intent (See 9 Am. J ur., Burglary §§ 26, 49).

B. THE POSTURE OF THE EVIDENCE
BEARING UPON THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE DEFENDANT AT THE
TIME OF THE OFFENSE IS SUCH AS TO
REQUIRE THAT THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED THAT IT MUST FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE DEFENDANT DID NOT AFFECT HIS ABILITY TO ENTERTAIN A SPECIFIC INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIME
CHARGED.
The evidence bearing upon the mental condition of
the defendant at the time of the alleged offense, assuming it not to be sufficient to excuse the defendant from
culpability altogether, is of sufficient posture to present
to the jury an issue as to whether the defendant could
entertain a specific intent to commit the crime charged.
This evidence would require the court to instruct the
jury on lesser included offenses not involving a specific
intent, or not involving the state of mind and intention
essential to first degree murder.
The evidence presented on behalf of the defendant
bears primarily upon the issue of sanity or mental condition. That the killing occurred in the manner described by the prosecution cannot be denied, and no
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Issue is made here upon that score. Substantial evidence of mental impairment was offered by the defense,
and it is worthwhile to summarize the picture presented.
The testimony reflects that the defendant had an I.Q.
of 67, "which would put him in what you would call
the feeble-minded range" ( T. 364) ; "that mental illness
is very frequently in specific cases of this kind, namely,
from very early childhood on . . . " (T. 365); that
"feeble-mindedness is related to a condition of mental
illness" (T. 367); that the defendant's response to the
Rorschach Test was "very deviant statistically speaking" ( T. 399) ; that the defendant "was a mentally
deficient person with some personality difficulties along
with it" (T. 364); that the defendant was confined to
Utah State Training School at American Fork, and
that a vasectomy operation was performed on the defendant on August 7, 1957, to sterilize him (T. 340);
that the defendant's juvenile court record reflected a
history of "mauling over women on street," and a "sexual attack on half sister" (Defendant Exhibit 24) ;
that on the very evening of the commission of the principal offense the defendant had been questioned by a
deputy county sheriff in connection with an earlier
attack upon another girl with a piece of iron (T. 288301) ; and, according to an expert witness on behalf
of the defendant, "once launched, launched on an impulse, whatever it is on, something which stirs him up,
once launched upon that he has no built-in mechanism
in his machine, so to speak, which can stop him from
completing the act.... In him there is very little differ-
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ence between thinking, talking, and doing.... I don't
think he knows whether he thinks something, whether
he does it ,or whether he has talked about it" (T. 373).
The prosecution witnesses characterized the defendant
as a "mild" mental deficient (T. 413); that the defendant "has an unrestrained sexual drive" and that a person
could be "mentally ill" without having "illusions" ( T.
430-1)
0

It is submitted that the evidence bearing upon
mental condition, including feeble-mindedness could
affect the ability of defendant to entertain the specific
intent essential to the crime of burglary ("specific
intent to commit larceny or any other felony"), or
"felonious" killing. We are not unmindful of those
Utah decisions which assert the general proposition
that where a killing takes place in the perpetration of
a felony it is "murder in the first degree and can be
nothing else" (State v. Condit, 101 Utah 558, 125 P.2d
801; see also State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134
Pac. 362, and State v. Oblizala, 60 Utah 47, 205 Pac.
739) . These cases are distinguishable as no issue of
mental condition was presented for consideration.
The Supreme Court of Utah in two notable decisions has formulated the view that a mental condition
falling short of "legal insanity" may impair the mind
of the accused sufficiently to warrant the jury in finding
that he could not entertain the intent essential to the
greater crime, and thus the degree of the crime must
be reduced to that offense which does not involve a
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specific intent (State v. Green (August 27, 1931), 6
P.2d 177; State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac.
1071). These cases are land-mark decisions and are
frequently given considerable attention by jurists and
others interested in the development of the relationship
between crime and mental responsibility. In the Green
case, this Honorable Court made the following observation:
"While an accused is not entirely relieved from
the responsibility for the commission of a crime
on account of insanity unless the insanity be of
such a nature and degrq.e that he did know the
nature or quality of his acts, or that he did not
know the act was wrong, or that his mind was
so impaired by the deed that he was unable to
control his act, nevertheless a mental disease
falling short of these effects may, where a particular intent is a necessary element of a higher
degree of a crime~ have the elf ect of reducing the
degree of such crime.n (Italics supplied.)
The Anselmo case involved a first degree murder
conviction, where evidence that the defendant was an
epileptic and had been drinking heavily caused our
Supreme Court to reverse upon the following rationale:
"While the jury found his condition in that
respect was not such as to affect his mental capacity to relieve him from responsibility, yet it may
have been such as to affect his mental capacity
to cruelly deliberate and premeditate on his acts
... While one's mental condition may not excuse
the act, it may nevertheless affect the degree of
guilt" (P. 145).
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Admittedly, the Green and Anselmo decisions
concern themselves with other than felony murder
cases, but the enunciated principle expressed is no
less applicable to all offenses involving a specific intent
as an essential element. It is of interest to note that
approximately half of the nation's courts have adopted
the partial responsibility doctrine urging the concept
that a defendant may suffer from such a mental disturbance that, while not excusing entirely, it will reduce
the grade of the offense (See The Report of the American Bar Foundation, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 1961, pp. 355-7; Weihofen, PARTIAL INSANITY AND CRIMINAL
INTENT, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 505; W eihofen and Overholser, MENTAL DISORDER AFFECTING
THE DEGREE OF CRIME, 56 Yale L. J. 959).
The cases treating with the doctrine predominately have
involved the reduction of first degree murder to second
degree murder, but the underlying rationale would be
"applicable to any crime calling for some 'specific
intent' on the part of the accused ... " (The Report
of the American Bar Foundation, MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW, supraJ at 355; See
also People v. Goshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P. 2d 492;
Weihofen, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE, P. 176 (1954) ).
The principle urged here, and previously applied
by this Court, does not red1tee the responsibility for the
greater crime, but implies fuU responsibility for the
lesser crime (See Taylor, PARTIAL INSANITY
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AS AFFECTING THE DEGREE OF CRIMEA COMMENTARY ON FISHER V. U. S., 34
Calif. L. Rev. 625 ( 1946) ) .
In the New Jersey trial upon a felony murder
charge the trial judge instructed that the accused should
be acquitted of the charge if the jury found he was
mentally incapable of forming an intent to commit
the robbery out of which the killing arose (State v.
Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249).
C. FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
INSTRUCT UPON LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
IN THE FIRST DEGREE WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
OF THE DEFENDANT.
Of course, where the evidence does not raise an
issue of a lesser included offense the trial court need
not give such instruction, but where there are different
degrees of culpable homicide, depending upon the intent
of the accused at the time .of the slaying, it is the duty
of the court to instruct the jury upon appropriate
lesser included offenses (State v. Mewhinney, snpra)
and this duty devolves upon the trial court whether or
not such lesser included offense instruction is expressly
requested (26 Am. Jur., Homicide, § 554).
In the instant case, and because of the bearing
that the defendant's mental condition reasonably could
have upon the intent requ.ired for the principal offense,
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murder in the second degree should have been presented
to the jury as a possible alternative finding. It was
altogether possible that the jury reached the result it
did, though satisfied that the defendant suffered from
some form of mental impairment which contributed to
the commission of the crime but not having been properly instructed as to the degrees of responsibility
failed to take such impairment into consideration (See
generally in this regard, White, IN SANITY IN
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1923), p. 633) ).
Failure to instruct upon unpremeditated murder
as a lesser included offense of a felony murder has been
held to be error (People v. Koerber, 244 N.Y. 147,
155 N .E. 79). In the l(oerber case, the New York
Court of Appeals stated:
"His own evidence on the point need not be
accepted as true even if uncontradicted. We may
doubt whether the evidence of intoxication adduced by this defendant would carry sufficient
weight with an intelligent jury to affect its verdict. It presented, however, a serious question,
affecting a substantial right, which should not
have been withheld from the consideration of the
triers of fact. We cannot say that, with proper
instruction, 'but one decision and that adverse
to the defendant could reasonably have been
reached.' When the alternative presented was
conviction of murder in the first degree or acquittal, a conscientious jury would scarcely bring
itself to a verdict of not guilty in this case. If
they had been instructed that other verdicts were
permissible, they might or might not have found
the defendant guilty of a lesser degree of felo-
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nious homicide. 'Ve therefore cannot overlook
the failure of the court to give proper instruction,
as we might if we could reach the conclusion
that there was a lack of sufficient evidence to go
to the jury that defendant was, in the only relevant sense, too drunk to form the speci~~ intent
for committing robbery" (p. 82-3).
It makes no logical difference whether intoxication
or mental condition impair the ability to form the specific intent (See Weihofen and Overholser, MENTAL
DISORDER AFFECTING THE DEGREE
OF A CRIME, supra, who make the following observation at page 962: "If the mental state requisite to a
given crime is absent, the crime has not been committed.
To what cause the absence of such mental state is to
be attributed would seem immaterial. Intoxication
is not a circumstance that excites any sympathy. Unless
involuntary, it is no defense to criminal liability. Nevertheless, if it is proved that a defendant charged with
a deliberate and premeditated killing was too drunk
at the time to deliberate and premeditate, he cannot
be convicted of first degree murder; he must be convicted, if at all, of some lesser degree of homicide, not
because we countenance drunkenness as a mitigating
circumstance, but because he did not commit the more
serious crime'') .
Where the facts reasonably raise an issue as to an
element of the greater offense, and even when the
greater offense involves the prosecution under statutes
which declare that killing a human while engaged In
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the perpetration of enumerated felonies shall be murder
in the first degree, the court cannot usurp the right of
the jury to consider a lesser offense by an imperative
or binding instruction as was given here (26 Am. Jur.,
Homicide,§ 555, citing Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 28
L.Ed. 262, 4 S.Ct. 202).
In State v. Stenbach (September 21, 1931), 2 P.2d
1050, 79 A.L.R. 878, the Supreme Court of Utah
concluded in a homicide case where intoxication was involved that " ... the ability to form a particular or
specific intent may be lacking and yet there may be
sufficient mental capacity to form an intention to do an
act which results in death."
When all of the competent evidence is viewed in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, mental responsibility, as it bears upon the specific intent essential to
the crime charged, remains as a paramount issue of
fact which should have been presented to the jury. The
failure to give a reasonable alternative to the jury
must be construed as substantial and material error.

POINT II
THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IT COULD
ACQUIT THE DEFENDANT IF THEY
FOUND THAT AT THE TIME OF THE OF:F'ENSE THE DEFENDANT WAS SUFFERING FROM A DISEASED OR DEFECTIVE
20
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l\lEN'rAL CONDITION, AND THAT THE
l{ILLING WAS A PRODUCT OF SUCH MENTAL ABNORMALITY C 0 N S TIT UTE D
ERROR AND WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THEACCUSED.
After advising the jury that the issue of "insanity"
had been raised by the defendant, and that they could
acquit him if his sanity was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court defined the term "insane" as
follows:
"The term 'insane' as used in these instructions
means such a perverted and deranged condition
of a person's mental faculties as to render him
either incapable of distinguishing between right
and wrong, or incapable of knowing the nature
of the act he is committing; and where he is consciol!_s of the nature of the act he is committing
and able to distinguish between right and wrong
and knows that the act is wrong, yet his will,
that is, the governing power of his mind, has
been so completely destroyed that his actions are
not subject to it, but are beyond his control.
"Temporary insanity, as well as insanity of
longer duration, is recognized by the law.
"A mere lack of moral restraints leading to a
surrender to criminal thoughts and actions is
not in legal contemplation sufficient to find a
person insane" ( T. 444) .
Defense counsel excepted to the failure of the court
to give the following instruction ( T. 480) :
"If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Defendant killed Karen Mechling, but
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if you believe that at the time he was insane, in
that he was suffering from a diseased or defective
mental condition, and that the killing was a
product of such mental abnormality, then it is
your duty to acquit him of the crime charged"
(R. 62).
It has been suggested, and reasonably so, that when
the doctrine of "partial responsibility" is applied, that
the historical test of insanity as a complete defense, i.e.,
the right and wrong test (M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. &
F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843)), and the irresistable
impulse test (State v. Green, supra) must be supplanted (see Weihofen and Overholser, MENTAL
DISORDER AFFECTING THE DEGREE OF
A CRIME, supra~ at p. 978).
The instant case presents to our court a perfect
opportunity to reexamine the law of Utah as it relates
to mental disorder and criminal responsibility. The
quoted instruction, supra~ is a pot pourri of language
which would confuse and mislead an intelligent jury.
The hardship it works is manifest here, where an obviously deranged, ill and feeble-minded defendant must
meet his Maker because the jury had no adequate,
humane and lawful gauge to guide its determination.
Nothing can be added here by placing upon the scale
the vast plethora of decisions, legal articles and psychiatric papers which place the M~Naghten rule in disrepute (see Weihofen, THE URGE TO PUNISH,
p. 60, et seq. ( 1956)).
The

M~N aghten

rule has been criticized princi-
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pally for the reason that it places emphasis only upon
the "cognitive" ability of the accused, ignoring the
effect of the mental condition upon his "volition". Two
recent developments have been illuminating in this
area of mental responsibility, and give us hope that
the courts will depart from the historic test and adopt
a more realistic view. In United States v. Durham
(D.C. Cir., 1954), 214 F. 2d 852, the court repudiated
both the "right-and-wrong" and "irresistible impulse"
tests, in favor of the "product" rule. Critical of both
tests, Judge Bazelon observed:
"We find that as an exclusive criterion the
right-wrong test is inadequate in that (a) it does
not take sufficient account of psychic realities
and scientific knowledge, and (b) it is based
upon one symptom and so cannot validly be
applied in all circumstances. We find that the
"irresistible impulse" test is also inadequate in
that it gives no recognition to mental illness
characterized by brooding and reflection and so
relegates acts caused by such illness to the application of the inadequate right-wrong test. We
conclude that a broader test should be adopted."
The court thereafter fortnulated the test that it deemed
more responsive to modern concepts of psychiatry and
the law, concluding:
"Whenever there is 'some evidence' that the
accused suffered from a diseased or defective
mental condition at the time the unlawful act was
committed, the trial court must provide the jury
with guides for determining whether the accused
can be held criminally responsible. We do not,
23
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and indeed could not formulate an instruction
which would be either appropriate or binding in
all cases. But under the rule now announced,
any instruction should in some way convey to
the jury the sense and SJlbstance of the following: If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused was not suffering from
a diseased or defective mental condition at the
time he committed the criminal act charged, you
may find him guilty. If you believe he was suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition when he committed the act_, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not
the prod'ltet of S'uch mental abnormality_, you may
find him guilty. Unless you believe ,beyond a
reasonable doubt either that he was not suffering
from a diseased or defective mental condition_,
or that the act was not the product of such abnormality_, you must find the accused not guilty by
reason of insanity. Thus your task would not be
completed upon finding, if you did find, that the
accused suffered from a mental disease or defect.
He would still be responsible for his unlawful
act if there was no causal connection between
such mental abnormality and the act. These
questions must be determined by you from the
facts which you find to be fairly deducible from
the testimony and the evidence in this case."
(Italics supplied) .
The other recent development which has given
impetus to an enlightened approach to the relationship
between mental condition and criminal responsibility
is the Model Penal Code which has been so carefully
drafted by the American Law Institute. The following
provision is intended to replace the tests used in the
instant case:
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" Aperson is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirement of law" (American Law Institute,
Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, Sec.
4.01 (1955)).

By either test it is apparent that a substantial improvement has been worked upon the law, as words such
as "right," "wrong," "knowing," and "irresistible impulse" have been discarded. Indeed, as recently as 1958,
our Supreme Court has been obliged to squirm through
the semantic maze of distinguishing "or" and "and"
(State v. Kirkham, 7 Utah 2d 108, 319 P. 2d 859).

~

~

In the case at bar, the jury could acquit if they
could find that the defendant could not distinguish
between "right and wrong." No endeavor is made to
supply a definition of "wrong," and the jury is left to
indulge its own imagination as to the concept. Both
the views advocated in Durham and in the Model Code
supply much simpler tests. Durham would ask the
jury if the crime was the "product" of a mental disease
or defect, whereas the Model Code would abandon the
word "wrong" and substitute "criminality." The jury
here might well have asked itself, "What does the judge
mean by 'wrong,' does it mean "morally wrong," or
"contrary to law," or both?" The instruction requested
by defense counsel would place all of these ambiguities
at rest, and give to the jury an adequate and modern
test to guide its determinations.

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

For 90 years New Hampshire has rejected the
right-and-wrong test, adopting instead the view that
the question of the existence of insanity as a total
defense presents a question to the jury not resolvable
by any particular test (State v. Pike (1870) 49 N.H.
399, 6 Am. Rep. 533; State v. Jones (1870) 50 N.H.
369, 9 Am. Rep. 242). In 1953, an English Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment recommended
abandoning the M'Naghten rule in favor of a rule
which would permit the jury to determine whether at
the time of the act the accused was suffering from
disease of the mind or mental deficiency to such a
degree that he could not be held responsible. The Commission reported:
"The gravamen of the charge against the
M'Naghten Rules is that they are not in harmony with modern medical science, which, as we
have seen, is reluctant to divide the mind into
separate compartments-the intellect, the emotions and the will-but looks at it as a whole and
considers that insanity distorts and impairs the
action of the mind as a whole."
As a practical matter, Durham, and the New
Hampshire rule releases the expert witness from the
straight-jacket which confines his testimony to matters
relevant to "right-and-wrong." For a collection of
authorities approving this approach see Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same Coin,
22 U. OF CHI. L. 'REV. 320; Zilboorg, A. Step Toward Enlightened Ju.stice, 22 U. OF CHI. L. REV.
331; Guthnacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Wit26
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nessJ 22 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 325; E. De Grazia,
The Distinction of Being ltiadJ 22 U. OF CHI. L.
REV. 339; Guttmacher and W eihofen, Psychiatry and
the Law (1952); Sobeloff, llrom MJNaghten to DurhamJ and Beyond-A Disct~;ssion of Insanity and the
Criminal LawJ 41 A.B.A.J. 793; and collected law review articles and notes in Annotation, 45 A.L.R. 2d
1447, at 1463.
It is hoped that our courts can be released from
the mire of confusion which prompts so many different
instructions. The trial court in the instant case reflects
a sincere desire to ride every horse in the field of menta]
responsibility, and the result is that none is thoroughly
presented nor correctly handled. To remove from the
consideration of the jury the right-and-wrong test
would enable it to consider all of the evidence reflecting
upon· the defendant's mental condition at the time of
the act, including evidence of feeble-mindedness, and
emotional and character disorders. Moreover, the absence of apparent impulsive conduct would not preclude
the jury from drawing legal "insanity" from an act
which given the appearance of being "coolly and carefully prepared" (Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, supraJ Report 110-111 (1953)).

POINT III
THE ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR
WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTAN-
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TIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT IN
THAT IT WAS HIGHLY IMPROPER AND
WAS CALCULATED TO INFLAME THE
MINDS OF THE JURY.
The summation of the prosecution's case was presented by all three prosecuting attorneys. The first of
these arguments was presented by an assistant District
Attorney who resided in the same town as the victim.
The following remarks were made by Mr. Ivins:
"Therefore, I feel it would be of no value to
you as jurors for me to talk to you about guilt
or innocence, because this fact has been established and admitted by the defendant, himself.
The District Attorney's Office, County Attorney's Office, the Sheriff's Office have never
throughout the course of preparing this case or
trying it ever had any doubts that we had the
right defendant; we were trying the right man"
(T. 451).

*

*

*

*

"I personally, perhaps, have become more
emotionallly involved in this matter than some
of my col~~agues. The offense, itself, was committed within a few blocks of my home in American Fork. I was acquainted with many of the
participants. I have become acquainted with the
family since the incident occurred. I know the
horrible impact that the incident had on the citizenry of American Fork. I know how they reacted in horror and sadness, and I know how my
own children come from from school emotionally
disturbed and upset because of this hideous horrible thing that had happened. And you can't
explain to a child why it happens; it's impossible
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to explain. For that reason, perhaps, I am closer
to the em<?tjonal involvement of this thing than
many others who are present here" ( T. 452-3) .

*

*

*

*

"Of course, the person who was the victim of
this terrible deed is not present; is unable to be
present. ~ o.t only did this young girl-not only
was she deprived of her right to live out a full
and complete life by the horrible act of this
defendant, but she was-her body was subjected
to the indignities of an autopsy. The memory of
this gir1 has been considered tainted by the horrible deed and act that was done. The family
has been subjected to humiliation and indignities
beyond expression because of the publicity which
has been nation-wide, which has been given to
this crime. Never will we know the heartbreak
and sadness that has been caused to the family
by this horrible deed that was perpetrated by
Mr. Poulson. For no reason, a senseless act for
one purpose only, to satisfy his own lust, to kill
a 11 year old girl. There is no more horrible deed
could have been committed against society than
the one that Mr. Poulson committed; no more
horrible deed than-that I can even conjecture,
think of, 1Je,cause of the attack upon an innocent
11 year old girl. It is horrible to contemplate"
(T. 453).
It is submitted that the foregoing portions of
counsel's argument were highly inflammatory and
prejudicial to defendant. This argument endeavors to
suggest that the case would not have been prosecuted
unless the "District Attorney's Office, County Attorney's Office, the Sheriff's Office" were satisfied that
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the defendant was guilty. This implies a belief based
upon the judgment of the respective offices, rather than
the evidence produced at the trial, that the defendant
was guilty. Such conduct is manifestly prejudical to
the defendant (People v. Beal, 116 Cal. App. 2d 475,
254 P. 2d 100; People v. Hoffman, 399 Ill. 57, 77 N.E.
2d 195; State v. Susan, 152 Wash. 365, 278 P. 149).
A fair and impartial analysis of the evidence could
hardly embrace references by counsel to his personal
familiarity with the facts of the killing, nor gratuitous
suggestions that his own children were "emotionally
disturbed and upset because of this hideous, horrible
thing that had happened." Such an argument is grossly
improper and could only have been intended to excite
the prejudices and passions of the jury against the
defendant.
The remarks of the P,rosecutor are all the more
prejudicial in the light of the crin1e itself, which was
especially abhorrent, and would easily produce the
result intended by counsel. The remarks would tend
to detract the minds of the jury from the evidence, supplanting therefor the base appeal for prejudice and
passion (State v. Goodwin (Mo., 1919) 217 S.W. 264).
In their totality, the prosecutors' statements were
clearly intended to frighten the jury into a conclusion
consistent with its finding. Under, these circumstances,
the argument is highly prejudicial and constitutes reversible error. That counsel for the defendant fail~d to
interpose an objection to the argument does not con-
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stitute a waiver of this improper conduct, especially
where the life of the defendant is at stake. See Annotation, 50 A.L.R. 2d 766.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully concluded that the trial court
committed error of a nature that was prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendant. The instruction
to the jury confining the alternative findings to guilty
of murder in the first degree or not guilty wholly failed
to present the proper alternative lesser included offenses where the issue of mental responsibility was so
dominant.
The instructions themselves relating to "insanity"
were ambiguous and confusing serving as no useful
guide to appraise the evidence bearing upon the mental
condition of the defendant.
Finally, the argument of the prosecutor was grossly
improper, bringing into the trial matters far beyond
the competent and admissible evidence. The argument
was an appeal to prejudice, emotion and passion, was
in extremely poor taste, and had the desired effect of
encouraging the finding of guilty.
No greater responsibility rests upon the shoulders
of a trial court than to insure to a defendant on trial
for his life a fair and impartial consideration of all the
evidence, and where the punishment imposed cannot
be undone, it behooves the court to resolve all disputed
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issues of law in favor of the defendant. The gravity of
capital punishment has an important bearing where
mental responsibility is the predominant issue, and to
send to death a young man with a mental age half his
physical age, and having real and substantial evidence
of mental disease and derangement, is to walk blindly
against the enlightened body of modern law which gives
meaning and import to such a condition. To ignore the
effect of such a condition upon the intent essential to
the principal offense, is to refuse to keep step with the
development of well-reasoned .law.
Accordingly, we respectfully urge that this Honorable Court reverse the finding of guilty and direct a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM G. FOWLER
1101 Newhouse Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
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